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How do improvements in information impact market performance? This dis-
sertation examines the effect of an innovative initiative launched by a private com-
pany in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Beginning in October 2000,
it set up 1700 internet kiosks and 45 warehouses that provide wholesale price in-
formation and an alternative marketing channel to soybean farmers in the state.
I develop a theoretical model of this intervention and estimate the impact using
a new market-level dataset with spatial geo-coded information. The causal effect
is isolated by exploiting the variation in the timing of the introduction of kiosks
and warehouses across districts of the state. The estimates suggest an immediate
and significant increase in the monthly wholesale market price of soybeans after the
introduction of kiosks, lending support to the predictions of the theoretical model.
While the presence of warehouses appears to have no effect on price, warehouses
are associated with a dramatic reduction in the volume of sales in the traditional
markets. Moreover, there is a significant increase in the area under soy cultivation.
The estimates are robust to disaggregated measures of treatment and comparisons
with alternative crops grown in the same season as soy. The analysis suggests that
information can substantially enhance the functioning of rural markets by increasing
the competitiveness of buyers.
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The effect of information provision on market performance has been of con-
siderable interest to economists and policymakers. When a significant fraction of
households engaged in agriculture depend on output markets for their livelihood,
institutional innovations that improve the functioning of such markets play a po-
tentially important role in determining income (Deaton [1988], Fafchamps [1992],
Besley [1997], Bardhan and Udry [1999]). Knowledge of prevailing prices can al-
low farmers to reap the gains from broader market search. An increase in return
can induce farmers to re-optimize their decisions regarding land allocation towards
alternative crops.
In the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, more than 65 percent of the
total workforce is directly involved in agriculture, making it the most important
income-earning opportunity [Economic Survey 2005]. Traditionally, farmers sell
their produce to traders operating in government regulated wholesale agricultural
markets, called mandis. The traders in turn sell to processing companies. There are
approximately 230 main mandis in the state where farmers periodically sell their
produce through an open outcry ascending bid auction. The auction begins when
a government employee visually inspects the quality and sets the initial bid. From
here, the traders bid upwards until the crop is sold [Upton 2003].
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Although the traders make up for lack of infrastructure such as transport and
storage facilities in rural areas, they are also well informed about prices prevailing
in different markets and the price offered by processors (Siamwalla [1978], Hayami
et al. [1988], Thomas [2003], Banerji and Meenakshi [2004]). Farmers often do
not have information about market conditions prior to the sale. Moreover, proces-
sors are unable to perfectly monitor the traders. Access to information as well as
direct interactions between farmers and processors can therefore have a potentially
important effect both on the price received by rural producers and on their behavior.
A large private sector company, ITC Limited, launched a unique intervention
in October 2000 in the state of Madhya Pradesh that to some extent addressed this
need.1 The intervention had two dimensions; internet kiosks were set up in villages
that enabled farmers to access daily wholesale prices of soybean, both in the local
mandis as well as the price offered by ITC (a processor of soybeans). In addition,
warehouses (called hubs) were established that enabled scientific testing of quality
and facilitated the sale of soybean by the farmers directly to the private company.
After comparing the price in nearby mandis and the price offered by ITC at the
hubs, farmers can decide where to sell their produce. Furthermore, ITC is able to
judge the quality of soybean that it purchases directly from the farmers at different
prices.
This dissertation examines the impact of this innovative initiative on the price
received by soybean farmers in the mandis and on their subsequent planting deci-
1The ITC group is one of India’s largest private sector companies with a market capitalization of
approximately 11 billion US dollars and annual sales of 2.6 billion US dollars. ITC has a diversified
presence in cigarettes, hotels, agricultural commodities, packaged foods and other consumer goods
[Anupindi and SivaKumar 2006].
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sions. I develop a theoretical model that explains how the provision of information
and the presence of scientific testing together affect the price of soy in local markets.
Improvement in price information to farmers, due to the presence of kiosks, is likely
to break down the trader’s monopsony power leading to an increase in the offer
price of the good in the mandis. The presence of a hub, however, is likely to exert
two opposing forces. On the one hand, direct buying by ITC is expected to divert
a part of the sales away from the mandis, leading to an upward pressure on price,
the competition effect. On the other hand, scientific testing of quality performed at
the ITC hubs might induce farmers to self-select, putting a downward pressure on
the price offered in the mandis, the composition effect. If farmers with good quality
soybean have a greater tendency to sell directly to the private company, the effect
of the hub on the mandi price is a priori ambiguous, and is ultimately an empirical
question. I test the predictions of the model using a new mandi level dataset with
spatial geo-coded information.
The location and installation date of each internet kiosk and hub, available
from the private company, provide the spatial and time patterns of the implementa-
tion of the intervention in the state of Madhya Pradesh. GIS measures of distance
are constructed to exploit the heterogeneity in the proximity of mandis to hubs.
The outcomes, monthly wholesale price and volume of crops sold in all government
regulated mandis in the state from April 2000 to September 2005, are available
from the Madhya Pradesh State Agricultural Marketing Board. Additional price
data in a sub-sample of mandis is available from April 1998. Measuring the output
response to this intervention is crucial for understanding the effect of this interven-
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tion on farmers’ behavior. Annual district level data on area cultivated, production
and yield of crops from 1998 to 2004 is available from the Commissioner of Land
Records, Madhya Pradesh.
This is the first attempt to collect detailed data on price and volume of crops
sold in government regulated wholesale agricultural markets, along with spatial geo-
coded information, to examine the impact of information technology on the function-
ing of rural markets in Central India. Using differential timing in the introduction
of kiosks and hubs across the districts of the state, the analysis finds an immediate
and significant increase in the average price of soybean after the kiosks are intro-
duced, lending support to the predictions of the theoretical model. The presence of
an internet kiosk in a district is associated with an increase in the monthly mandi
price of soybean by 1-5 percent, taking into account mandi and month fixed effects
and district-specific time trends. While the presence of hubs appears to have no
effect on average price, hubs are associated with a dramatic reduction in the volume
of sales in the mandis. This implies that the composition effect perhaps offsets the
competition effect, pushing the estimate of the impact of the hub on mandi price
towards zero. In addition, the dispersion of soybean prices across the affected man-
dis in Madhya Pradesh decreased after the intervention. The increase in price and
the reduction in dispersion appears to influence farmers’ planting decisions. There
is a significant increase in the area under soy cultivation due to this intervention.
The estimates are robust to disaggregated measures of treatment and comparisons
with alternative crops grown in the same season as soy.
Two contributions of this study stand out. First, the results contribute to the
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substantial economic literature emphasizing that information is critical for the effi-
cient functioning of markets. A series of theoretical papers including Stigler [1961],
Diamond [1971], Salop and Stiglitz [1977], Burdett and Judd [1983], Stahl [1989],
McAfee [1995], and Ellison and Ellison [2004] describe models where the presence of
costly search lowers competition and creates an inefficient allocation of goods across
markets. There is also a growing empirical literature assessing the effects of im-
provements in information on both the level and dispersion of prices. For instance,
Brown and Goolsbee [2002] show that the growth of online price comparison sites
reduced term life insurance premia by 12 percent in the US.2 Finally, a number
of studies have examined price dispersion in a variety of product markets. Baye,
Morgan and Scholten [2006] provide a survey of studies suggesting that reductions
in information costs may lead to either more or less price dispersion, depending on
the market environment and the interaction between all market agents.
Second, this analysis sheds light on the role of information technology in en-
hancing rural development. According to Marker et al. [2002], “the contrast between
the complexity and expense of some of these technologies and the urgent, basic needs
of the poor has led some to doubt whether it should be a priority for development
agencies or for developing countries themselves.” Despite the absence of rigorous
evidence on the impact of such interventions, there is widespread enthusiasm for
the adoption of digital technology for sustainable development.3 In a recent study,
2Similarly, Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso [2001] find that consumers who purchase
cars through online markets pay 1.5 percent less than other customers.
3Numerous IT projects have been implemented in developing countries, such as the introduc-
tion in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Peru of village pay-phones and telecenters that provide remote
health care services to villagers, computer literacy and teacher training in rural schools along with
improved administrative capacity for local authorities. See World Bank [2003] for a survey of
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Jensen [2007] shows, using micro-level survey data, that the adoption of mobile
phones by fishermen and wholesalers in South India is associated with a dramatic
reduction in price dispersion, the complete elimination of waste and an increase in
both consumer and producer welfare. This dissertation presents robust empirical
evidence on whether such technologies can improve the functioning of rural markets.
1.1 Agricultural Marketing in Madhya Pradesh
Agricultural markets have been in existence in India for centuries. Accord-
ing to Thomas [2003], at the simplest, each neighborhood had its own designated
location, where producers and buyers met in order to engage in trade. The whole-
sale spot markets for agricultural commodities, as seen today, very much reflects
this history. After independence, many major policy decisions affected agricultural
commodities markets.
Beginning in 1951, the different Five Year Plans laid stress on the development
of physical markets, on farm and off farm storage structures, facilities for standard-
ization, grading, packaging and transportation. To achieve an efficient system of
buying and selling of agricultural commodities, state governments and Union Ter-
ritories enacted legislations (Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Act) for
regulation of agricultural markets. By the end of 1950, there were 286 regulated
markets in the country, that increased to 7521 by the year 2005. The basic ob-
jectives of the network of physical markets have been to ensure reasonable gain to
the farmers by creating an environment for fair play of supply and demand forces,
projects that use information technology to combat poverty.
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regulate market practices and attain transparency in transactions.
The Central Government advised all the State Governments to enact Mar-
keting Legislation to promote competitive and transparent transactional methods
to protect the interests of the farmers. The Government of India also declares a
minimum support price (MSP) for “primary commodities” every year at the na-
tional level. The aim is to ensure remunerative prices to the growers of the produce
with a view to encourage higher investment and production. Some of the principal
crops are rice, wheat, pulses, oilseeds, cotton and sugarcane. Today, there are ap-
proximately 25 agricultural commodities for which the government of India sets a
minimum support price [Thomas 2003].
According to the Ministry of Agriculture Report [2005], the purpose of reg-
ulation of agricultural markets was to protect farmers from the exploitation of in-
termediaries and traders and also to ensure better prices and timely payment for
the produce. However, over a period of time these markets have acquired the sta-
tus of being restrictive and monopolistic, providing little help in direct and free
marketing, competitive trading, information exchange and adoption of innovative
marketing systems and technologies [Government of Madhya Pradesh 2008]. Farm-
ers are unable to sell their produce directly. Exporters, processors and retail chain
operators are unable to acquire desired quality and quantity of produce for their
business due to restrictions on direct marketing. The produce is required to be
transported from the farm to the market yard and only then for processing to the
plant. There is thus an enormous increase in the cost of marketing and the farmers
end up getting a low price for their produce.
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An important dimension of state involvement in markets is that of regula-
tion, a phenomenon which has several layers of market penetration. As noted by
White [1993], “The first layer is the relatively superficial one of parametric policy
intervention by the government to facilitate market operations, correct market dis-
tortions, achieve social or developmental goals and the like. At a deeper level, the
states involvement is pervasive; it is the source of a complex network of institution-
alized arrangements which permeate markets and influence the way they operate:
for example, the legal definition of property rights, licensing laws, standardization
of weights and measures, creation and validation of money and the regulation of
contracts.”
The central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (MP) is the second largest state
in terms of area and ranks seventh in population.4 More than 11 million people are
directly engaged in agriculture, contributing 30 percent to the state GDP [Economic
Survey 2005]. With most development indicators below the national average, it is
among the lower income states of the country.5 The Madhya Pradesh State Agricul-
tural Marketing Board, established in 1973, facilitated the development of mandis
(government regulated wholesale agricultural markets) as an essential requirement
for farmers to receive a fair price for their produce. Currently there are a total of
233 main mandis in the state with well built storage and display areas where farmers
periodically sell their produce. In addition, there are 256 ‘sub-main’ mandis that
4The state has a total area of 308,144 square kilometers and approximately 60 million people
[Census of India 2001]. It is closest in area to the state of Arizona in the United States.
5In the year 2000, MP had a per capita gross state domestic product of Rs. 7947 and a rural
headcount ratio of 37 percent, which was almost 30 percent lower than the national average [UNDP
2002].
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have lower levels of infrastructure and are linked to the main mandis administra-
tively. Besides the regulated mandis, there also approximately 1321 weekly bazaars
held in the villages where farmers sell some of their surplus produce and buy other
goods.6.
The MP State Agricultural Marketing Act, 1972 prohibits transactions outside
the mandis. Every farmer is required by law to sell his or her produce in these
regulated markets. According to Upton [2003], “transactions outside the mandis
were officially prohibited by the Government to protect farmers from exploitation
by unscrupulous buyers. Open auctions were considered the best safeguard against
this.” Nevertheless, an estimated 12 percent of the produce is sold by farmers to
cooperative societies and village merchants outside these spot markets. There is a
provision in the by-laws of the Act that exempts farmers with small landholdings
from selling inside the physical confines of the mandis. Moreover, a small fraction of
farmers prefer to sell the produce directly to cooperatives or village merchants with
whom they may have prior credit linkages. The mandis in the state are classified into
four categories (A-D) based on the annual revenue collected through the payment of
mandi tax by buyers. There are 30 A grade, 25 B grade, 84 C grade and 94 D grade
main mandis located in the towns of MP.7 Every buyer operating inside a mandi
pays 2.2 percent of the purchased value as tax to the mandi committee.8
6See www.mpmandiboard.com
7The A grade mandis are largest with a gross annual income of over Rs.40 Lakhs. B grade
mandis have a gross annual income between Rs.20 Lakhs and Rs. 40 Lakhs. C grade mandis have
an annual revenue between Rs. 6 Lakhs and Rs. 20 Lakhs and D grade have a gross annual income
lower than Rs. 6 Lakhs (1 Lakh=100,000).
8Weekly tax is paid by the buyers to the mandi committee. Buyers are not allowed to resell
the produce in the mandi after declaring the total quantity bought to the mandi officials.
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The procurement process in the mandis of different sizes is identical. However,
the average price of soybean in A grade markets was 4.5 percent higher than those
in D grade markets in the year 2001. This price variation could be due to differences
in the number of buyers operating in each market. Farmers, responding to surveys,
express a preference for going to A grade markets where a large number of buyers
operate, which leads to better price realizations, presumably due to greater com-
petition and lower collusion amongst the traders [World Bank 1997]. The buyers
in the mandi are all licensed traders; i.e. each buyer needs to obtain a license to
operate inside a mandi.9 These traders are mostly intermediaries and eventually sell
the produce to millers, processors and plant owners (involved in crushing or refining
of the produce). A trader who buys on behalf of a private company is sometimes
called a commission agent because the private company pays him a commission to
build a relationship that ensures timely delivery of produce in the future.10
According to Singh [2005], soybean cultivation in India was negligible until
1970, but it grew rapidly thereafter in response to the domestic deficit of edible
oil supply. India is now the 5th largest producer of soybean in the world and MP
produces more than 60 percent of India’s soybean crop. The largest producer of
soybean in the world is the USA, followed by Brazil, Argentina and China as of
2005. India produces about 6 million tons of soybean annually. The state of MP is
the largest producer of soybean in India, followed by Maharashtra and Rajasthan.
9Each buyer needs to apply for a license from the mandi committee. A buyer can apply for
multiple licenses to operate in multiple mandis. In 2005, the license fees per mandi was Rs. 1000
plus security deposit based on a trader’s one day maximum purchase. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that license fees are not prohibitive.
10For example, ITC buys soybean from their agents and pays them 1 percent of the purchased
value as commission.
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Soybean is usually sown in June because it requires sufficient moisture for its germi-
nation, and the monsoon rains are very important for the subsequent growth of the
crop. There are 2 major cropping seasons in India: Kharif and Rabi. The Kharif
season falls during the south-west monsoon (July-October) when crops are grown
both in rain-fed and irrigated areas. Soy is a Kharif crop. The Rabi season falls
during the winter months (November to March) when crops are grown mostly in
irrigated areas. From November to March, most soy farmers grow wheat [Govern-
ment of Madhya Pradesh 2005]. The crop is ready to be harvested in September and
being a cash crop, almost the entire crop is marketed. Approximately 65 percent of
the total soybean produced in a year is sold in the mandis from October-December,
immediately after the harvest. There also appears to be considerable seasonal fluc-
tuation in price. For instance, the average price in the fourth quarter, over the years
2000-2005, is 8.5 percent lower than in the second quarter.
Farmers transport their produce by animal-drawn carts and tractors to a
nearby mandi where it is sold through an open outcry ascending bid auction. Field
studies reveal that farmers travel 30-50 kms. on average to reach a mandi and they
usually make this trip a couple of times each month (Upton [2003], Anupindi and
SivaKumar [2006]). The farmer displays his produce in a heap in the mandi yard
or simply stands besides his tractor. The auction begins when the auctioneer (a
government employee) visually inspects the quality and sets the initial bid. From
here the traders bid upwards until the produce is sold. This is a very rapid process
and in a matter of seconds the final price is decided. The government employee
and the traders move from heap to heap picking up samples of the produce and
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making a price estimate. In principle, edible oilseeds are traded on the basis of
fair average quality (FAQ) determined by the presence of dirt, damaged seeds and
moisture content in each lot of produce offered for sale. For instance, the highest
or the FAQ price is offered to a sample of soybean that is on a 2-2-10 quality scale
(2 percent of the sample contains dirt, 2 percent contains damaged seeds and there
is 10 percent moisture in the seed).11 Traders start to discount the price of beans
when the proportion of dirt, moisture and damaged seeds exceed that level.
Once the final price is set, the farmer’s produce is bagged and weighed on a
manually operated balance scale. Various field studies have pointed out that the
actual weight of the crop is often manipulated at this point because of the inaccuracy
of the crude beam scales. Moreover, the farmer is made to pay for the cost of bagging
and the final cash payment to the farmers is also often delayed (Prahalad [2003] and
Upton [2003]). After weighing, the full value of the farmers produce is calculated
and the farmer is paid in cash. Oilseed grading is undertaken in an unscientific
manner in nearly all mandis; formal testing of the oil content to discern quality is
not performed [World Bank 1997]. It is important to clarify the various dimensions
of soybean quality in this context. The transactions between farmers and buyers
are based on observable features of quality such as the amount of moisture, dirt and
damaged seeds in each lot of produce offered for sale. This is mostly dependent
on the storage technology used by farmers, which is likely to be highly correlated
with their income. However, there is an unobservable dimension of quality that
11If a farmer had soybean with say, 1-1-5 quality parameters, he would still receive the FAQ
price.
12
refers to the amount of oil and protein content of the seed. This aspect of quality
is dependent on the variety of seeds planted by the farmers, the timely application
of pesticides and fertilizers and use of farming techniques. Discussion of the impact
of the intervention on overall improvement in both observable and unobservable
aspects of quality is presented in a later chapter.
Soybean prices in India are determined to an extent by conditions prevalent
in the international market. Soybean is processed to extract edible oil and a high
protein residue called de-oiled cake (DOC).12 Edible oil produced in India is sold in
the domestic market while DOC is exported as animal feed to the Middle East and
South East Asian Countries. The mandi price of soybean in Madhya Pradesh tracks
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) prices of soybean, DOC and oil reasonably
closely. The correlation coefficients of the monthly mandi price of soybean in MP
with the CBOT price of soybean, soy-oil and soy-meal are 0.84 (0.06 s.e.), 0.42 (0.03
s.e.) and 0.87 (0.09 s.e.) respectively.13
1.2 Description of the e-Choupal Intervention
ITC Limited, an Indian private sector company, implemented an e-Choupal
program that enabled it to buy soybean directly from the farmers starting in October
2000.14 Prior to this intervention, ITC bought soybean from traders (operating in
12The processing of soybean is done by solvent-extraction process. In India, soybean is composed
of 82 percent DOC and 18 percent oil. DOC is used as a major animal feed ingredient for poultry
and cattle (www.sopa.org).
13The CBOT price is listed in US Dollars/Ton. The monthly mandi mode price listed in Ru-
pees/Quintal was converted to US dollars/Ton using monthly exchange rates. CBOT prices of
crops and currency exchange rates are available from the International Financial Statistics of the
International Monetary Fund.
14The word choupal stands for a village gathering place in Hindi.
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the mandis) and processed the beans to produce edible oil for sale in the the Indian
domestic market and DOC for export.15 Since ITC did not have any direct contact
with the farmers, it commissioned certain traders (called commission agents) to buy
soybean from the mandis on its behalf. The company was dependent on its agents’
knowledge about local farmers and their produce.
Interviews with ITC officials revealed that the distortion of quality undertaken
by the agents meant that the company paid a high price for a lower overall quality
of soybean, which upon processing yielded less oil and more contaminated DOC.16
The ability of traders (or middlemen) to identify quality has been noted in markets
for many other goods by Biglaiser [1993] and Li [1998]. In this scenario, although
traders are skilful in recognizing the quality of soybean sold by farmers, they may
not necessarily preserve it while reselling it to the processor.
ITC believed that by bypassing the intermediaries, it would be able to better
control the quality of the produce and also lower its transaction costs. A puzzling
feature is that ITC was unable to design incentives to correct the behavior of its
agents.17 One possible explanation could be that discerning quality and preserving
it while storing and transporting the crop is a very expensive process because quality
is measured on a continuous scale. Moreover, the company had dual roles for the
infrastructure that it was creating as it planned to sell its own consumer products in
15ITC is not a monopsonist in the soybean business, having less than a 10 percent of the market
share of soy in MP. There are 5-6 large buyers of soy in MP with Ruchi Industries being the largest.
16Agents buy soybean of varying quality throughout the day. They mix different grades of
quality and sell the lot to the company at a high price. Moreover, agents often ask ITC to increase
its price saying that the price is too low for them to buy any soybean in the mandis.
17There is substantial theoretical and empirical literature which describes the failure of compen-
sation schemes to generate correct behavior. For instance, see Kranton and Swamy [2005] for a
discussion of the failure of the agency system in the context of textiles in colonial India.
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rural areas in the future. According to Kumar [2004], “ITC calculated that it saved
Rs. 12.9 million in the first year of operation through better quality oil and DOC
obtained from processing soybean procured through the e-Choupal intervention.”
This intervention provided an alternative both to ITC for procuring soybean
and to soy farmers for selling their produce. Beginning in the year 2000, ITC
established a total of 1700 internet kiosks and 45 hubs over the course of 4.25
years in the major soy growing districts of the state.18 The intervention has two
dimensions. Internet kiosks were set up in villages that provide information about
mandi prices to soy farmers in the state. Each day the (minimum and maximum)
prices of soybean in approximately 60 local mandis are posted on the website.19
Along with this information, ITC’s own offer price at its 45 hubs is also posted.
Specifically, each evening, ITC posts the prevailing mandi prices and its offer price
for high (FAQ) quality soybean at the hubs that is guaranteed for the next day.20
Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the daily average posted prices for a period of 45
days in the year 2004. The posted prices of ITC are relatively competitive with the
prevailing mandi prices and generally lie between the daily minimum and maximum
price of the mandis. In addition, information on farming techniques and weather
conditions is also available in the local language to farmers through the kiosks. Each
internet kiosk was designed to cater to its host village and four other neighboring
18The full cost for setting up the infrastructure was borne by ITC and farmers could use these
services free of charge.
19www.echoupal.com
20The offer price of ITC posted in the evening on the website is honored the next day. The next
morning, ITC offer prices may be revised according to the mandi movements. The ITC price can
go up from the posted price (if the mandi rates are higher) but can never fall. Thus ITC offers a
guaranteed price.
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villages within a five kilometer radius [Prahalad 2003]. Host villages were chosen
according to population and landholdings of the farmers.21 The internet kiosks are
managed and operated by trained farmers who are selected from within the village
and provide free services to other soy farmers.22
Hubs are mostly warehouses that are established in towns. The 45 hubs include
the 9 processing plants leased by ITC. Hubs represent a point of contact between
farmers and the ITC. A farmer can sell directly to ITC by going to the nearest
hub. ITC’s goal is to have a hub within a 30-40 km. radius of its target farmer
[Prahalad 2003]. A cluster of 40 kiosks were set up around each hub such that it
would represent the nearest hub to that ‘catchment area.’ Once the farmer arrives
at one of the hubs, his produce is carefully tested to discern quality. ITC can offer
a price below the posted FAQ price if quality is below the FAQ level. However, the
minimum support price (declared annually by the Government of India) is the lowest
price that ITC can offer for a certain poor quality threshold.23 After the price is
21A host village is typically a middle rung village with a population of 1000-3000 (according to
the 1991 census) and an average size of atleast 1000 acres.
22ITC used its relationship with the commission agents to identify villages where the internet
kiosks would be placed. The computer equipment was typically placed in a farmer’s house. The
chosen farmer was called the sanchalak. ITC held meetings in villages to explain the e-Choupal
concept and asked for nominations for sanchalak. Farmers either recommended others or volun-
teered themselves. Thereafter, ITC interviewed all respondents and selected the farmers according
to different criteria such as (i) education level (at least secondary school), (ii) a cement house in
the village with young children (iii) farmer with an average of 15-20 acres of landholding and (iv)
having a good rapport with other farmers in the village. The chosen farmers were then trained in
basic computer usage. The farmers that operate the kiosks receive 0.5 percent of the value of each
transaction that is made through the kiosk at the ITC hub, thereby giving them the incentive to
spread price information widely to other farmers. Every day, each sanchalak gives out a certain
number of tokens to farmers who wish to sell their produce to ITC. Tokens were necessary for
ITC to keep track of the commission that the sanchalak would earn as well as the daily cash
requirement at the hub. Conversation with farmers revealed that these tokens are not restrictive.
Moreover, cellphones appear to play an important role in transmitting information to farmers in
neighboring villages.
23If a farmer with a very poor quality of soybean shows up at the hub, such that the offer price
falls below the minimum support price, ITC is forced to send him back. ITC is not allowed to
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set and accepted by the farmer, his beans are weighed on an electronic weighbridge,
and the weight is multiplied by the offered price. The farmer then receives cash
instantly.24
In the initial period of the intervention (between October 2000 to April 2003),
ITC used a provision in the by-laws of the Marketing Act to procure soybean from
farmers at its hubs. This provision permitted farmers with small landholdings and
annual output, who are unable to travel to the mandi, to sell their produce outside
the regulated markets, in front of a government official in the village [Government
of MP 2003]. The state Marketing Act was subsequently amended in April 2003
allowing farmers to sell outside the mandis provided that the buyers obtain a ‘Pur-
chase Center License’. This license enables a particular buyer to establish centers
to procure agricultural produce outside the physical confines of a particular mandi
subject to full documentation of its transactions and the payment of mandi tax.
According to Upton [2003],“At the conception of the e-choupal, ITC was able to
convince the government of the potential benefits to the farmer and economy. The
government amended the act to legalize purchases of beans outside the mandis.
Since the website was accessible to anyone, including the government to cross-check
posted prices - it facilitated the government’s acceptance of the initiative.”25.
buy soybean below the minimum support price (MSP). Transactions below the MSP are allowed
in the mandis simply because they take place in front of government officials who can validate the
quality claim.
24The hubs are managed in part by ITC’s former commission agents, who are now called ‘samy-
ojaks’ or collaborators. ITC has tried to integrate its commission agents into this intervention
because they provide important services like transportation and storage and have knowledge about
local village conditions. ITC had approximately 120 CAs before the intervention but only 45 have
been turned into samyojaks.
25Buyers had to pay annual fees to obtain the license as well as pay the regular mandi tax on
every purchase. The license fees per center is Rs. 10,000 plus security. The license can be renewed
every five years [Government of MP 2003]
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The amendment of the Act represents an important step towards greater flex-
ibility in the marketing of agricultural produce in the state. The MP Government
issued another amendment on June 9, 2004 that decentralized the entire procure-
ment system in MP. Independent buyers could now apply for a central state-wide
“Special License” that allows them to procure outside all the mandis in the entire
state of MP. The special license was issued by the Marketing Board to ITC Limited
allowing it to procure outside any mandi in the state, subject to full documentation
of its transactions and payment of mandi tax. Although a few other competitors in
the soybean market have started buying outside the mandis through the purchase
center license starting in 2003, the special license is currently only with ITC. In
2005, the Special License fee was Rs. 2 Lakhs plus security deposit based on the
buyer’s one day maximum purchase. The license can be renewed every five years.
Conversations with Government officials revealed that the tax revenue increased
after the intervention, suggesting that traders operating inside the mandis might
be evading taxes as well. In fact, there is a proposal pending before the Central
Agricultural Ministry of the Government of India to allow private procurement of
agricultural produce at the national level.
Figure 2 shows the intensity of soy production across all the districts of MP.
The 45 districts can be divided into two main regions: the high soy producing region
in the west central part of the state and the low soy producing region in the east.
The abundance of deep and medium black soil in the western region of the state
makes it very conducive to soy production, while the eastern and northern regions
are primarily a rice growing belt. The shaded region in Figure 3 shows the districts
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where the intervention was implemented. The kiosks and hubs were built in the 23
high soy producing districts in the west central region of the state.26 The “treated”
districts are further characterized by slightly higher soy prices, as depicted by the
quarterly trend in the raw price of soy from 1998-2005 in Figure 4.27 Table 1 shows
the total number of kiosks and hubs in each district; an average of 74 kiosks and
2 hubs per district were built. The majority of the hubs were established in the
same town as a main mandi; as depicted by the starred locations in Figure 3. The
distribution of a subset of kiosks is depicted in Figure 5.28
While paved roads connect major towns and cities, most of the villages and
interior areas are connected by poor quality unpaved roads (as depicted by the lighter
shaded lines in Figure 6). This makes it especially difficult for farmers to travel
from their village to the mandis on a regular basis. The importance of rural road
infrastructure to economic growth and prosperity has been discussed extensively
by Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig [1993], Jacoby [2000], Key, Sadoulet, de
Janvry [2000] and Jalan and Ravallion [2002]. Sparse road connectivity leads to
extremely high transport costs for the farmers, leading to limited spatial arbitrage
opportunities.
In the next chapter, I develop a simple model that captures some of the key
26According to Census 2001, there were 45 districts in Madhya Pradesh. Three new districts
were created in 2003 making a total of 48 districts in 2005. I have considered the total number of
districts as in census 2001 to avoid complications.
27According to World Bank [1997], the majority of the soy processing plants are located in the
west-central region, thereby reducing the number of soybean buyers in the east. Moreover, being
closer to the west coast ports of India as well as to the major oil consumption markets means that
freight costs are lower, leading to higher soybean prices in the west. These factors might explain
why prices are lower in the east.
28This figure was made available from the International Business Division of ITC Limited. It
does not represent the spread of all 1704 kiosks.
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features of the rural marketing environment. In particular, I consider the presence
of physical transport costs and information frictions, which tend to limit farmers’
choices of where to sell their produce. An important motive for ITC to start buying
directly from the farmers was to be able to control the quality of soybeans that it
purchases. The endogeneity of supply in a simultaneous game gives us predictions
about the determination of prices of differentiated products. There are other sig-
nificant features of the intervention, such as the offer of a guaranteed price by ITC
Limited and the repeated interactions between the traders and farmers, that are
not explicitly modeled. However, even this simple and tractable model provides an




The Value of Information and Direct Access to Buyers: Theoretical
Investigation
Consider a variant of the Hotelling (1929) model in which farmers are uniformly
distributed along the interval [0, 1]. The good has 2 quality levels - high (H) and
low (L). Farmers observe the quality of their good. A proportion λ of the farmers
have low quality and are distributed uniformly along the unit interval. The farmers
have unit supply; i.e., each farmer sells one or zero unit of the good.
There are two towns located at the extremes and in each town is a market. For
simplicity assume that only one trader operates in each market.1 Trader 1 is located
at x = 0 and trader 2 at x = 1. The unit cost for each trader operating in each
market is c, and is independent of quality. For ease of exposition, c is normalized
to 0.2 Farmers incur a transportation cost t per unit of distance.3 Thus, a farmer
living at x incurs a cost of tx to go to trader 1 and a cost of t(1−x) to go to trader 2.
Let us assume that traders do not possess the technology to verify quality. Further
assume that both traders sell the good to processors at a competitive price p
′
i, where
1As discussed in the previous chapter, there are multiple traders operating in each mandi who
participate in the procurement auction. Banerji and Meenakshi [2004] structurally estimate the
auction procedure in these markets and find evidence of collusive behavior within markets. In this
chapter, I do not explicitly model the auction process or the strategic interaction between traders
within a given mandi, but rather focus on the interaction between traders across mandis.
2This represents the miscellaneous transaction costs incurred by the traders such as the costs
of storing, weighing, loading, and bagging per unit of soybean.





∗+(1−γi)p∗∗ such that p∗∗ > p∗ and γi is the proportion of trader i’s goods
that are of low quality.4
The timing of the game is as follows: Traders simultaneously choose prices.
Farmers then choose to sell to either trader 1 or trader 2.5 Let the price offered
by trader 1 be p1 and the price offered by trader 2 be p2. I will examine outcomes
under different assumptions about the observability of prices to farmers.
Suppose first that farmers are not perfectly informed about the price offered
by traders prior to sale. A farmer can sell the good to a trader if and only if he
knows the price offered by that trader. I adopt the model developed by Tirole
[1988], which builds on Butters [1977] and Grossman and Shapiro [1984], to analyze
spatial competition with imperfect information. Let Θi(i = 1, 2) denote the fraction
of farmers who know the price offered by trader i. Farmers located anywhere along
the segment have equal chance of knowing this price information. The potential
supply to trader 1 is a proportion Θ1 of all farmers. A fraction 1 − Θ2 of this
potential supply do not know the price offered by trader 2. The remaining fraction
Θ2 also know the price offered by trader 2 and therefore constitute a more elastic
or competitive segment of supply. In this competitive segment of supply, the farmer
who is indifferent between the two traders is located at x, where x is given by
equating p1 − tx = p2 − t(1 − x). The supply to trader 1 in the case of imperfect
4This captures the idea that a processor samples the quality of the produce and pays a price
based on the proportion of low quality. γi is determined in equilibrium. (0 ≤ γi ≤ 1)
5I implicitly assume that transport costs are below the price offered by the processor for low
quality (t < p∗) such that farmers always prefer to sell.
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and trader 2’s choice similarly. I will examine the situation where Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ.




∗ + (1− λ)p∗∗ − t(2−Θ)
Θ
(2.1)
A. Introduction of Kiosks
When kiosks that post prices are introduced, Θ increases. It is straightforward to





> 0). The provision of price
information to farmers increases the proportion of the market where traders com-
pete. This result yields the first testable implication:
Prediction 1: As the fraction of informed farmers increases, the equilibrium price
offered by traders will increase.
This prediction will be directly tested in the subsequent chapter. The magnitude
of the increase will depend on the parameter Θ. If Θ is high to begin with, then
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the increase in the price caused by the introduction of kiosks is unlikely to be very
large. A plausible concern is that interlinked transactions between farmers and
traders, such as the provision of credit by traders that binds the sale of the final
product by the farmers to them, will imply that better information will not lead to
more arbitrage opportunities (as discussed by Bardhan [1989], Bell and Srinivasan
[1989]). However, interviews with farmers did not reveal any evidence in support
of significant interlinkages in the production of soy. Farmers reported that they
obtain credit from nationalized banks and cooperative societies rather than from
the traders. I found that farmers with marginal land holdings sometimes do depend
on traders for credit, but this was not very prevalent. The village traders buy the
produce from the farmer in return for the credit. Thus, instead of giving back the
money to the trader, the farmer gives back his produce. Interlinkages appeared to
be present for very small farmers in some areas. The rapid expansion of the rural
bank network is noted by Burgess and Pande [2005].
B. Introduction of Kiosks and Hubs
Now, suppose that a third trader, which I call trader 3, enters and locates itself next
to trader 2 at x = 1. This is consistent with how ITC Limited introduced its hubs;
40 out of the 45 hubs were located in the same town as the main market. Theoret-
ically, it might be optimal for trader 3 to locate itself in the middle of trader 1 and
2 to capture supply. In reality hubs must be established in towns and not on farm
land. The towns are located at the extremes of farm land, which is where trader
3 can set up hubs. Moreover, since ITC is both a buyer and a seller, there may
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be potential benefits to ITC for locating itself in a market town. For example, in
addition to buying soybeans, it planned to sell its own consumer goods in the future
and local proximity of firms that produce similar, competing or related products
would reinforce the absolute advantages of many small areas.
According to Jovanovic [2003], the location of firms depends not only on costs
of production and marketing, but also on economies of scale, activity-specific back-
ward and forward linkages, path dependence and the existence of sophisticated mar-
kets. This is because competitiveness often depends on highly concentrated “local”
knowledge; capabilities and common tacit codes of behavior which can be found
in spatially concentrated clusters. Firms therefore have an incentive to locate in
an agglomeration as externality operates through well-defined anonymous market
interactions [Johansson and Quigley 2004].
I assume that the price offered by all traders is known to all farmers prior
to sale (Θi = 1). Trader 3 has access to superior technology that allows it to
verify quality. Farmers know that trader 3 can distinguish between quality levels.
I continue to assume that traders 1 and 2 do not possess the technology to verify
quality. Each of the three traders set prices. Let p1 be the price offered by trader
1 and p2 be the price offered by trader 2. Trader 3 sets p
L
3 for low quality good





3 ). The proportion of low quality goods received by each trader,γi, is
determined endogeneously.
The farmers with low and high quality good who are indifferent between going
to the two market towns are located at ρ and µ respectively. Since trader 2 and
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trader 3 are located in the same market town, the outcome of their price competition
is similar to a Bertrand outcome. The supply to trader 2 is given by:
SL2 (p) =

(1− ρ)λ if p2 > pL3
1
2
(1− ρ)λ if p2 = pL3





(1− µ)(1− λ) if p2 > pH3
1
2
(1− µ)(1− λ) if p2 = pH3
0 if p2 < p
H
3
and similarly to trader 3. I will assume pH3 > p
L
3 = p2 to derive the supply to traders
1, 2 and 3 given the price vector p. Trader 2 will not receive high quality goods.
This will be true in equilibrium as I confirm below. Each trader’s respective supply
of low quality goods is:
SL1 (p) = ρλ =
p1 − p2 + t
2t
λ









Each trader’s respective supply of high quality goods is:
SH1 (p) = µ(1− λ) =
p1 − pH3 + t
2t
(1− λ)
SH3 (p) = (1− µ)(1− λ) =





The profits of the three traders are:
Π1(p) = (p
′
1(p)− p1)[SL1 (p) + SH1 (p)]
Π2(p) = (p
∗ − p2)SL2 (p)
Π3(p) = (p
∗ − pL3 )SL3 (p) + (p∗∗ − pH3 )SH3 (p)
Recall that trader 1 receives a price p
′











ρλ+µ(1−λ) . In equilibrium,
the three traders receive different proportions of low and high quality goods. The
following prices constitute a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
t < λ
3






3((1− λ)p∗∗ − t) + λ(t + 4p∗)
3 + λ
pH3 =
3(p∗∗ − t) + λ(2p∗ − p∗∗)
3 + λ
Note that trader 1 offers a price based on the proportion of low and high quality
goods it attracts. The introduction of a third trader who is able to verify quality,
drives down the price of low quality good to the marginal value of low quality, given
by p∗. The price offered by trader 2 is then too low for it to attract any high qual-
ity goods. The proof is in the Appendix. This result gives us the second testable
implication:
Prediction 2: Entry of an additional buyer with the ability to verify quality of
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the good leads to an ambiguous effect on average prices. The price offered by exist-
ing traders will increase if and only if t > (p∗∗ − p∗)(1− λ).
With heterogeneous quality, there are two opposing forces on the prices offered
by traders 1 and 2. On the one hand, entry by trader 3 puts upward pressure on the
price offered by traders 1 and 2, the competition effect. On the other hand, sort-
ing of farmers based on their quality puts a downward pressure on price offered by
traders 1 and 2, the composition effect. It will ultimately be an empirical question
to determine which of the two effects dominates.
PROOF




The proof is as follows: Consider, for example,
pL3 < p2 < p
∗
Then trader 3 has no supply, and its profit is zero. On the other hand, if trader 3
charges p3 = p2 + ε where ε is positive and “small”, it obtains the entire supply of
low quality good and has a positive profit margin of p∗ − p2 − ε. Therefore, trader
3 cannot be acting in its own best interest if it charges pL3 < p2 < p
∗. Now suppose
that,
pL3 = p2 < p
∗
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The profit of trader 3 is (p∗ − pL3 )(1 − ρ)/2. If trader 3 increases its price slightly
to pL3 + ε, its profit becomes (p
∗ − pL3 − ε)(1 − ρ) which is greater for small ε. In
this situation, the market share of the trader increases in a discontinuous manner.
Trader 3 will not charge more than its marginal value for low quality good p∗ (it
would make a negative profit if it did). Trader 2 cannot distinguish between qual-
ity. If it charged an ε above p∗, while trader 3 charged p∗, it would attract all low




∗ + (1 − γ2)p∗∗) reduces to p∗. Thus, trader 2 will also not charge more
than its marginal value for low quality good p∗ (otherwise it would make negative




In addition, if pH3 > λp
∗ + (1 − λ)p∗∗ (the maximum price that trader 2 can of-
fer without making negative profits), then trader 2 has no incentive to deviate.




(1 + λ)(p∗∗ − p∗)
Note that the curve represents the equation: tbar = λ
3
((1+λ), where tbar = t/(p∗∗−
p∗). The shaded region represents tbar < λ
3
((1 + λ), where the equilibrium exists.
This condition is more likely to be satisfied if t is low relative to the difference
between competitive prices of high and low quality good. In other words, the ratio
of transport costs to the price difference between high and low quality good should
not be very large.
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Note that pH3 > p1 > p2 = p
L
3 if and only if:
t <
3(1− λ)(p∗∗ − p∗)
3− λ
This implies that trader 3 attracts a larger proportion of farmers with high quality
goods, i.e. the indifferent farmer with high quality goods (µ) is located closer to
trader 1. Moreover, trader 1 attracts a larger proportion of farmers with low quality
goods, i.e. the indifferent farmer with low quality goods (ρ) is located closer to trader
2. This feature results in two opposing forces. On the one hand, entry by trader 3
puts an upward pressure on the price offered by traders 1 and 2, the competition
effect. On the other hand, sorting of farmers based on their quality puts a downward
pressure on price offered by traders 1 and 2, the composition effect.
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Chapter 3
Information Technology and Rural Markets: New Evidence from
Central India
3.1 Data
The data used in this chapter comes from five different sources. First, infor-
mation on monthly prices and volume of crops sold in all the 233 main mandis in
the state from April 2000 to September 2005 is available from the MP State Agri-
cultural Marketing Board.1 Second, annual district level production, yield and net
area under cultivation of crops from 1998-2004 is taken from the Commissioner of
Land Records, MP.2 Third, dates of installation and location of all internet kiosks
and hubs is obtained from the company’s business records. Monthly procurement
of soybean by ITC Limited at each of its hubs is also obtained from the company.
Fourth, annual administrative and demographic information at the district level is
taken from the census of India 2001 and lastly, geographic information on the loca-
tion of districts, towns and roads in the state is available from GIS files provided by
the ML Infomap agency.3
A total of 1704 web kiosks and 45 hubs were established in 23 (out of a total of
1Price is measured in Rupees/Quintal. (1 Quintal=100kgs) Quantity sold is measured in Tons.
2Production is measured in Thousand Tons. Yield is measured in Kgs/Hectare. Area in Thou-
sand Hectares. Net area cultivated refers to area under crops grown only during the kharif season
of Madhya Pradesh.
3These files were processed using the ArcGIS software. Vector data in the form of polygons,
points and lines representing districts, towns and roads are available for every district in the state.
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45) districts of MP during the time period from October 2000 to January 2005. The
installation date of an internet kiosk is defined as the day the computer equipment
was installed in the village by ITC. On the other hand, the hub installation date is
defined as the day the first direct sale was made by a farmer at the hub. In this
way, I measure effective installation of hubs. Table 2 provides the dates at which
the first kiosk and the first hub were set up in each district. The installation of the
first hub always postdates the installation of the first kiosk in a district. Figure 8
plots the distribution of the total number of kiosks and hubs over time. While there
are some kiosks without hubs, there are no hubs without kiosks. Thus at most two
effects can be identified - the effect of kiosks without hubs and the effect of kiosks
with hubs.
The state marketing board collects monthly data on prices and quantities sold
of 17 major crops in the 233 main mandis of the state.4 In a particular mandi,
different crops of varying quality are sold each day at varying rates. Mandi officials
record the price and quantity sold of every transaction. At the end of the day, a
daily minimum price, maximum price and mode price as well as total quantity sold
for every crop are recorded by mandi officials. The daily minimum price is the lowest
price that prevailed that day. The daily maximum price is the highest price that
prevailed that day. The daily mode price is the price at which the highest quantity
of a crop is sold in a day. From all the daily entries for a given month, a monthly
minimum, maximum and mode price as well as total monthly sales are calculated.5
4Although approximately 30 different crops are sold in these mandis all round the year, detailed
price and sales data is collected for only 17 major crops, out of which 10 are Kharif crops grown
in the monsoon season and 7 are Rabi crops grown in the winter months.
5The monthly minimum price is the lowest prevailing price in a given month (minimum of
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This monthly price and sales data is provided by each mandi to the central state
marketing board, from which I obtained the data for a period of 66 months (from
April 2000 to September 2005). With no measures of average price in a month, the
mode price can be considered the best available proxy for mean price. Additional
price data for a sub-sample of 30 A grade mandis is available for 90 months (from
April 1998 to September 2005). Data on individual transactions and on daily prices
and sales is not available.6
It is important to point out that I observe only the price of crops sold in
government regulated wholesale mandis. This data does not include the price posted
or offered by ITC. Moreover, these are raw monthly prices without any quality
grading, which is a major drawback since quality may have changed in response to
the intervention. An overall increase in the quality of soybean produced will tend
to bias my results towards finding a positive price effect of the intervention. On the
other hand, if farmers with high quality soybean prefer to sell directly to ITC at its
hubs, I should expect to find a modest decline in the price of soybean in the mandis
over time. Each of these concerns will be discussed at length in the subsequent
sections.
The monthly sales volume of a crop in a mandi measures the total quantity
that was sold in a month. This volume consists of two key components. The first
daily minimums). The monthly maximum price is the highest prevailing price in a given month
(maximum of daily maximums). The monthly mode price is the price that is associated with the
highest quantity of a crop sold in a month (mode of daily modes associated with highest quantity
sold).
6Daily price and sales recorded in individual mandis are not compiled by the state marketing
board. Moreover, individual mandis do not typically keep records of historical daily price and sales
information.
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component is the total amount of the crop sold inside the mandi yard, which is
recorded and calculated as described above.7 The second component is the quantity
sold by farmers directly to private buyers outside the mandi yard but for which
mandi tax has been paid to the concerned mandi.8 Thus, the quantity of soybean
sold at the ITC hubs is included in the mandi sales volume data. On average 3.62
percent of total quantity sold in the state annually is bought by ITC at its hubs.9
Since I observe monthly procurement of soybean by ITC at its hubs, I deduct this
amount from the relevant quantity sold in the mandi where it paid tax to obtain my
preferred measure of the total sales volume of a mandi, which excludes the amount
sold at the ITC hubs.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to collect and compile detailed data
on price and volume of crops sold in government regulated wholesale agricultural
markets, along with spatial geo-coded information, to examine the impact of in-
formation technology on the functioning of rural markets in the state of Madhya
Pradesh.
Table 3 provides summary statistics. Out of a potential 66 months of data for
each crop in each of the 233 mandis, I exclude any observation where the outcome is
recorded as zero. In some mandis, located in districts where a particular crop is not
intensively grown, transactions do not take place every month leading to a consider-
7Some smaller mandis are linked to the main mandi administratively. The quantity of crops
sold in these ‘sub-mandis’ is also included in the total sales volume of the main mandis.
8A buyer operating outside the mandi yard is required by the law to provide complete docu-
mentation (recording the quantity bought) to the mandi officials; this amount is added to the sales
volume of a particular mandi.
9This represents 2.85 percent of annual production of soybean in the state. Total production
is not equal to total amount sold because part of the produce may be kept back by farmers as
growing seed, or may be sold to village merchants outside the mandis who are not accounted for.
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able number of missing observations. From a panel of potential 15378 mandi*month
(233*66) observations for soybean, I am left with 10915 (11435) positive observed
values of mode price (sales).10
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the empirical analysis is to examine the impact of the increase in
information provision and direct access to a large buyer due to this intervention on
the functioning of government regulated wholesale agricultural markets over time.
To do this, I utilize panel data on monthly crop prices and sales to perform three
types of analysis that rely on plausibly exogenous variation driven by the interven-
tion. First, since different districts received kiosks and hubs at different times, I can
use this differential timing to isolate the impact of the intervention on the price of
soybean in agricultural mandis located in a district. Second, I use a triple-difference
approach to eliminate the effect of any unobserved determinants of outcomes, by
comparing soybean with alternative crops, over time and across districts. Since the
intervention potentially affected only soybean, other crops grown in the same season
as soybean can be used as comparison groups. Finally, GIS measures of distance
are constructed to exploit the heterogeneity in the proximity of mandis to hubs to
measure disaggregated treatment status.
The identification strategy exploits inter-district variation in the timing of the
introduction of kiosks and hubs. To the extent that the timing of the intervention
10The 15378 potential number of observations contain 35 (843) instances where the mode price
(sales) is recorded as zero and there are 4428 (3100) missing observations. This leaves a total of
10915 (11435) positive observed values of mode price (sales) for soybean.
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in different areas was chosen in response to actual and forecastable changes in the
local price of soybean, my results would be biased. However, since the date of the
introduction varied substantially across districts and was chosen far in advance by
ITC officials, this type of endogeneity seems unlikely to have been present.11 Figure
9 shows the percentage of districts with at least one kiosk and hub in each year. By
the end of 2000, 11 out of 45 districts (24 percent) had received at least one internet
kiosk while only 2 percent of the districts had at least one hub. By 2004, all the 23
districts (51 percent of total) had received at least one kiosk and hub.12 Figure 12
shows the trend in each district separately. It is difficult to imagine another factor
with a sharp and discrete change that drives both the introduction of kiosks and
changes in soybean price. Conditional on mandi and month fixed effects as well as
district-specific time trends, the timing of the introduction of kiosks and hubs across
districts is plausibly orthogonal to future movements in price.
While the fixed effects eliminate any concern that variation in kiosk and hub
introduction is driven by some unobserved time-invariant factor that also causes
changes in the price of soybean, a primary concern is that the results could be
driven by pre-existing differential trends in the price of soy between districts that
do and do not receive kiosks and hubs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
11Raisen, Sehore, Ujjain and Harda districts were selected to receive the kiosks first because these
districts contained ITC’s processing plants, which could serve as a hub. Subsequently additional
warehouses were leased (to serve the role of hubs) and kiosks were set up around each one of
them. The Chief Executive of the Agri Business Division of ITC Limited stated the following: “
We started with all locations around our processing units (to maximize on logistics savings). The
actual location of a processing unit is a function of which unit is available for toll operations, as
we depend on hired units. Thereafter, once we added warehousing hubs to the model, we rolled
into all the key soy growing areas. Even here sequence started with such locations that result in
the lowest landed cost of soybeans at each of the processing units.”
12Shivpuri is the only district which has internet kiosks but no hub. Thus only 49 percent of
total districts in the state received a hub.
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districts located in the western region of the state that received the intervention
are high soy producing districts. Soy constitutes more than 65 percent of total
volume of agricultural production in the monsoon season in this group of districts
as opposed to approximately 11 percent in the east (see Table 4). Therefore, the
placement of kiosks and hubs is by no means random as they were established in
districts with higher soy production. However, if districts with rapidly increasing
price (or increases in factors that in turn affect price) are also more likely to receive
kiosks, I will mistakenly attribute those changes to the introduction of kiosks.
Fortunately, with price data going as far back as 1998 for a sub-sample of
districts, it will be possible to test for the impact of pre-existing price trends. Table
5 shows that the 1998 and 1999 levels of soybean price are not predictive of which
districts receive kiosks. The dependent variable in panel A is 1 if kiosks were ever
introduced and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on initial levels of soybean price are
small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on the change in price
of soybean from 1998 and 1999 suggests that districts with rapidly increasing prices
are actually less likely to receive kiosks, although the results are not statistically
significant. In Panel B, I consider whether the timing of the introduction of kiosks
is correlated with the pre-existing levels and trends of price. The dependent variable
is 1 if kiosks were introduced in 2000 and 0 if they were introduced in 2001/2002. All
the coefficients are small and none are statistically insignificant, and the direction
of the effect is not consistent across the variables. The results suggest that there
is no substantial evidence that the timing of kiosk introduction is being driven by
differential trends in price.
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Overall, the considerable variation in the timing of the introduction of kiosks
and hubs across districts will be used to estimate the impact. The identifying
assumption is that in the absence of the intervention, there would have been no
differential change in the price of soy across the districts over this period.
3.3 Basic Results
I start by estimating:
Pijt = β1 + β2Kjt + β3Hjt + γi + µt + tφj + εijt (3.1)
where the outcome variable, Pijt is the log mode price of soybean in mandi i located
in district j at month t. Since prices are likely to change proportionally rather than
by a fixed rupee amount, it is sensible to transform the variable using logs.13 The γi’s
represent a full set of mandi fixed effects that control for unobserved time invariant
heterogeneity in mandi characteristics arising from a differences in infrastructure,
soil quality and market size.14 The µt’s represent a full set of month fixed effects
(there are 65 indicator variables for the sample going from April 2000 to Septem-
ber 2005) that control for any time varying aggregate factors affecting the price of
soybean across all the mandis in the state, such as world prices, common demand
shocks or common climate shocks.
To control for differential price trends across districts during the period of
13Moreover, the mode price appears to be positively skewed whereas the log mode price is much
more symmetrically distributed [Duggan and Scott Morton 2006]. Results are qualitatively similar
when estimated in levels.
14District fixed effects are essentially incorporated by including mandi fixed effects.
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interest, I also include district-specific time trends as represented by tφj. The stan-
dard errors are corrected to account for the fact that the intervention varies only at
the district-month (rather than at the mandi -month) level and for serial correlation
in the error term. εijt is a mandi -district-month specific error term. Kjt is an indi-
cator variable for whether there is a kiosk in district j in month t. Similarly, Hjt is
an indicator variable for whether there is a hub in district j at month t. Since hubs
were set up after kiosks, β3 measures the marginal effect of adding a hub to a kiosk.
Using the full sample of 233 mandis in 45 districts of the state, the results
indicate a positive and significant effect of kiosks on the average price of soybean
as presented in Table 6. The presence of a kiosk in a district is associated with an
increase in the average monthly mode price of soy in the mandis located in that
district by 1.2 percent. This result lends support to the theoretical prediction that
the the availability of price information to farmers reduces the monopsony power of
traders in local output markets. An increase in the competitiveness of traders leads
to an increase in the price of soybean in the mandis. Although the effect of a hub on
the mandi price of soybean is positive, the coefficient is very small and insignificant
(columns 1-3).
The results in columns 1-3 assume that the effect of the intervention is instan-
taneous. On the one hand, awareness about the presence of kiosks and learning over
time is likely to accentuate the effect of the intervention. On the other hand, supply
might respond to this sudden increase in price leading to a downward pressure on
the market price of soybean over time. To examine whether and how the effect
of kiosks varies over time, I include additional pre and post binary variables that
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indicate time periods immediately preceding or following kiosk introduction. This
allows me to differentiate between a level and a trend effect of the intervention. In
columns 4-6, I find that the significant increase in soy price tends to persist after
kiosk introduction. The coefficients on post 0-5 months and post 6 plus months are
significant and not statistically different from each other. In column 5, I add an
indicator variable for the months leading up to kiosk introduction, and find that the
difference between the post and pre coefficients is significantly positive.15
Table 7 summarizes the results from several specifications similar to equation
(3.1) above. In panel A, (columns 1-3) I include quarter*year fixed effects instead
of month*year fixed effects to check the sensitivity of my results after controlling
for alternative seasonal changes in price. The estimate of 0.012 on kiosks is almost
identical to the previous estimates. In columns 4-6, my results are robust to con-
trolling for differential price trends across mandis during the period of interest. In
columns 7-9, I include district specific linear trends and find an estimate of β2 to
be equal to 0.016. Since soy is most heavily traded between October-December, in
columns 10-12, I restrict the sample to the fourth quarter and find that the impact
of a kiosk is higher by one percentage point in the fourth quarter as compared to the
average effect in all periods (β2=0.023). In panel B, I restrict the sample to the 23
districts located in the west-central region of the state (the “treated” districts). Al-
though it is appealing to use the full sample since the coefficients are more precisely
estimated, this test is valuable for eliminating concerns about possible endogeneity
15Since I have already included a very rich set of controls for any time varying aggregate factors,
market characteristics and district time trends, including other variables (such as district level
literacy rate, number of farmers, total area, number of markets per district, do not make any
difference to my basic result.
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of the location of the intervention. All the results presented in panel B point to the
same conclusion that the presence of a kiosk increases the average monthly mode
price of soy in the mandis and the effect is larger in the fourth quarter. The pres-
ence of hubs has no significant effect on price. Moreover, the point estimates are
strikingly within the range obtained in Table 6, suggesting that the estimated effect
of the intervention is reasonably robust.
Table 8 presents the results for the average monthly minimum and maximum
prices of soybean in the local markets. One might expect different effects on mini-
mum and maximum prices, though my theoretical model does not investigate this
possibility as it simplifies by assuming a single price. Intuitively, if the minimum
price represents the price received by the least informed farmers, then I should ex-
pect the presence of kiosks to have a positive and significant effect on the average
minimum price in the mandis. Similarly, if the maximum price represents the price
already received by most informed farmers, I should then expect no additional effect
of the kiosks on the maximum price. In columns 1-3, the presence of a kiosk in a
district increases the monthly average minimum price by 1.7 percent. The effect of
a hub is insignificant. Moreover, the presence of kiosks and hubs have no apparent
significant effect on the average monthly maximum price of soybean in the mandis of
MP. This result further strengthens the argument that improvements in information
are responsible for the impact of kiosks on the average price received by farmers in
local markets.
There are at least two reasons why the observed effect of a hub might be
expected to be smaller than the effect of a kiosk. First, when the kiosks were set up
41
by ITC Limited, the introduction of a hub in the future was also announced. After
forming an expectation of strategic price setting behavior by ITC Limited, rational
traders operating in mandis might adjust their bids in response to this “announced”
hub. Thus, Kjt might be capturing part of the effect of a future hub in addition
to the effect of increased information provision. This would lead to a much smaller
additional effect of a hub when it actually becomes functional. Second, since quality
is scientifically tested at the ITC hubs, there might be sorting of farmers based on
the quality of their produce. If farmers with good quality soybean have a greater
incentive to sell directly to the private company, I would expect a modest decline in
the price of soybean in the mandis overtime. The result implies that the additional
competition effect of the hub is being offset by the composition change effect, leading
to a small and statistically insignificant net effect of the hub.
By measuring treatment at the district level, I assume that the presence of a
kiosk or a hub anywhere in a district affects all the mandis belonging to that district
equally. These districts are large with an average area of 6850 square kilometers and
contain on average five mandis. Since the hubs and kiosks are not uniformly dis-
tributed within a district, it is quite likely that some mandis located close to the
kiosks and hubs are affected more by this intervention than others located further
away. It is plausible that the true impact on affected mandis will likely be underes-
timated by aggregating treatment at the district level. Moreover, hubs and kiosks
located at the edge of a particular district, for instance, may have a greater impact
on the mandis belonging to a neighboring district. These spillover effects are not
allowed for in estimating equation (3.1). In a later section, I allow for treatment
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effect to vary by distance.
3.4 Alternative Crops
One potential concern with the results so far is that changes in price may
be correlated with unobservable changes in agricultural markets over time. For
instance, I do not observe the number of traders that bid on average in each mandi
in each month and changes over time in the number of bidders is likely to affect
the monthly price. If such unobservable changes are correlated with the timing of
kiosk or hub introduction then my results may be affected by omitted variable bias.
To address this possibility, I use a triple-difference approach to estimate the impact
of the intervention on the price of soybean using the crops that did not receive
the intervention as additional comparison groups. Aside from soy, ITC Limited
did not procure any other crop grown during the monsoon season through the e-
Choupal intervention.16. As long as the alternative crops sold in the mandis are
not impacted by this intervention either directly or indirectly, I can control for time
varying mandi specific factors using an alternative crop grown in the same season
as soy. The second largest crop (in terms of its share in total production) is maize
(see Table 4), which is not directly affected by this intervention. A natural starting
point is to compare the price of soy to the price of maize. I estimate the following
equation:
Pcijt = β1 + β2Soyc + β3Kjt + β4Soyc ∗Kjt + γi + µtc + tφj + εcijt (3.2)
16ITC began procuring wheat, a Rabi (winter) crop, starting in the year 2003 in MP.
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where Pcijt is the price of crop c in mandi i in district j at time t. Soyc is an indicator
for whether a particular observation is soy. µtc represents a complete set of month
fixed effects for each separate crop that control for time-varying aggregate factors
affecting each crop separately in the state. The rest of the variables are defined as
above. The key coefficient of interest is β4, which measures the effect of a kiosk on
the average monthly price of soybean relative to the price of the alternative crop,
after controlling for differential trends across districts.
Table 9 presents the estimates of equation (3.2) for two subsamples. In panel
A, the mode price of soy is compared with the mode price of maize. The sample
is restricted to those mandi-date cells where the prices of both soy and maize are
positive, so that the result is not driven by unobserved mandi characteristics which
can be a source of bias in OLS estimates. The results indicate that the presence of
a kiosk in a district increases the average mode price of soy relative to maize in the
mandis by 4.6 percent (columns 1-3). The presence of a hub has no discernible effect
on the price of soy. Since soybean is an edible oilseed it seems appropriate to consider
a competing oilseed, since the price of edible oilseeds in India are determined to some
extent by the international market.17 The second largest edible oilseed grown in the
same region and season as soy is groundnut (see Table 4). Panel B compares the
price of soy with the price of groundnut. The coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and similar in magnitude to the effect estimated in table 6, although the
estimate is not statistically significant. In part this may be because the sample size
17The oilseeds grown during the monsoon season in MP are soybean, groundnut, sesame, cot-
tonseed, castorseed, nigerseed and sunflower. Castorseed, cottonseed and nigerseed are generally
not considered edible oilseeds.
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is smaller, since there are fewer observations with price data available on both soy
and groundnut.
My triple-difference strategy assumes that the intervention had no impact on
crops other than soy. This assumption can be tested directly. The richness of the
data gives us multiple control groups formed by crops not affected by the interven-
tion (Meyer [1995], Duflo [2000], Bertrand et al. [2004]). In Table 9, panel C, the
results from a placebo test (comparing the price of maize to the price of groundnut)
are presented. The impact of the kiosks and hubs is very small and insignificant.
The estimated triple-difference is very close to 0. The coefficients are statistically
different from the corresponding coefficients in panel A. These results provide evi-
dence that the results are not driven by inappropriate identification assumptions.
3.5 Spatial Heterogeneity
An important underlying assumption in equations (3.1) and (3.2) is that within
a district, the effect of the intervention is the same regardless of distance to hubs
and kiosks. In this section, the above assumption is relaxed and the treatment
effect is allowed to vary by distance. I use geo-coded data to calculate the distance
between mandis and hubs. Using latitude and longitude of the towns that contain
the mandis and hubs, I calculate a straight-line Euclidean distance between two
planar coordinates. This allows me to construct a new explanatory variable for
whether there is a hub located “near” a particular mandi. I experiment with different
indicators of nearness (within 10 kms, within 20 kms, within 30 kms etc). Figure 10
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shows the distribution of the distance to the nearest hub from a given mandi. The
estimated kernel density function shows that the distance of many mandis to the
nearest hub is very large in spite of a very low mode.
With no available data on the coordinates of villages that contain kiosks, I
resort to an indirect method to capture the effect of “nearness” of a kiosk to a
mandi. Before doing so, it is useful to recognize that ITC’s goal in placing kiosks
was to maximize its covered area. To this end, the kiosks were organized as clusters
around the planned hubs, with well defined links based on proximity between a
given kiosk to a unique hub. According to ITC, a kiosk i is linked to hub j if hub
j is the nearest hub to kiosk i.18 Using this definition of nearness of kiosks to hubs,
and the measure of distance between hubs and mandis as discussed in the preceding
paragraph, kiosks are assigned near a mandi. ITC’s location strategy implies that
corner cases, where kiosks are equidistant to two or more hubs, are rare enough to
ignore the marginal error introduced by them.
It is possible that the price and quantity sold of soybean in mandis located
further away from a hub (or kiosk) are less affected by this intervention. The
specification below investigates this possibility. Moreover, the presence of a hub
(and kiosk) in a particular district can potentially affect mandis located in the
neighboring district.19 Since treatment is now measured at the mandi level, I am
implicitly assuming that farmers are allowed to move freely between districts. This
allows me to measure the impact of the intervention more accurately. The estimation
18Typically, an average of 40 kiosks are located within 30-40 kms of a particular hub.
19Farmers living in a particular district are not prohibited by law from selling their produce in
another district.
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equation is as follows:
yit = β1 + β2Kit + β3Hit + γi + µt + tφi + εit (3.3)
where yit is the outcome of soybean in mandi i at time t. Kit is an indicator
variable for whether there is a kiosk “near” mandi i at month t. Similarly, Hit is an
indicator variable for whether there is a hub “near” mandi i at month t. Since hubs
were set up after kiosks, β3 measures the marginal effect of adding a hub to a kiosk.
To control for differential price trends across mandis during the period of interest,
mandi-specific time trends represented by tφi are also included. Autocorrelation
is accounted by clustering the standard errors at the mandi -level. The rest of the
variables are as defined earlier.
3.5.1 Effect on Price
Table 10 shows the results for different indicators of nearness. The dependent
variable is the log mode price of soybean in mandi i at month t. In columns 1-3,
Hit is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub within 40 kms of a mandi i at
month t. Similarly, Kit is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk linked
to a hub that is within 40 kms of a mandi i at month t.20 The mandis that do
not have hubs within 40 kms constitute the comparison group. The presence of a
kiosk near a mandi is associated with an increase in the average price of soybean in
20The difference between Hit and Kit is in the date on which each of these variables takes the
value 1. By construction, I have assumed that the distance between a kiosk linked to a hub is
equal to zero.
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these mandis by 1.6 percent. In columns 4-6, the results indicate that the presence
of a kiosk linked to a hub within 60 kms of a mandi has a slightly lower effect (1.3
percent) on the average price of soybean (compared to the mandis that do not have
hubs within 60 kms). Moreover, in columns 7-9, the magnitude of the effect of kiosks
linked to hubs within 80 kms of a mandi becomes much smaller but is still positive
and significant. Finally, in columns 10-12, the effect of a kiosk located within 100
kms. of a mandi is close to zero.
The results suggest that the distance between the kiosks and mandis matters.
The closer the location of kiosks to the mandis, the bigger is the effect on price.
These effects are slightly larger than the district level aggregate effect presented
in Table 6. Table 11 (panels A and B), presents results from estimating alterna-
tive specifications. In columns 1-3, I include quarter*year fixed effects instead of
month*year fixed effects to control for seasonal changes in price. In columns 4-6,
my results are robust to controlling for differential price trends across mandis(rather
than districts) during the period of interest. In columns 7-9, I include district spe-
cific linear trends. The sign and the magnitude of the effects are consistently similar
to those presented in Table 10.
Interestingly, the observed difference in the effect of the intervention on price
in a mandi located near a kiosk as compared to a mandi located further away from
a kiosk does not appear to be enormous. A plausible explanation could be that
information is being obtained and transmitted between farmers located far away by
means other than kiosks. In fact, as pointed out by Jensen (2007), it has become
increasingly common to find farmers using mobile phones and pagers for marketing
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their output. Thus, even if a farmer is not physically located near a kiosk, he may
still have access to price information, which is likely to result in the underestimation
of the effect of kiosks.
3.5.2 Effect on Sales
The theoretical model predicts a reduction in the supply of the good to the
existing traders operating in the mandis after the introduction of the hubs by ITC
Limited. Recall that the supply to traders 1 and 2 after the introduction of trader
3 is lower than the supply prior to trader 3, leading to upward pressure on price.
Moreover trader 2 (the one located nearest to the hub) does not receive any farmers
with good quality soybean. An empirical test of whether direct buying by ITC
caused sales to be diverted from the mandis is therefore imperative to understanding
the effect of the intervention.
I investigate the impact of the intervention on sales volume in Table 12. The
dependent variable is the log volume of soybean sold (excluding sales to ITC) in
mandi i at month t. In columns 4-6 of Table 12, I compare the quantity sold of
soybean in the mandis located within 40 km. radius of a hub with that in mandis
located at a distance greater than 40 kms of a hub. The presence of a hub is
associated with a decline in the volume of sales in the mandis located within 40
kms of a hub by approximately 20 percent. The coefficient is significant at the 1
percent level. In columns 7-9, the presence of a hub within 60 km. radius of a
mandi leads to an insignificant decline in the quantity sold in these mandis. As the
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hub is located further away, the significant effect on sales disappears.21 The district
level effect of the intervention on the volume of sales in the mandis as presented in
columns 1-3 of Table 12 is also statistically insignificant. By measuring the presence
of kiosks and hubs at the district level in columns 1-3, I assume all mandis in a
district to be affected equally by a hub, even though some mandis are closer to
hubs than others. Moreover, some mandis in neighboring districts might be affected
as well. The results in columns 4-9 suggest a dramatic reduction in the volume of
soybean sales in the mandis when the hub is located within 40 kms of a mandi.
This result strengthens the argument in favor of investigating heterogeneous effects
of the intervention by distance.
An important point to note is that columns 4-9 of Table 12 also indicate
that the presence of a kiosk is associated with a significant increase in the quantity
of soybean sold in the mandis. This result is consistent with the prediction of
the model that improvements in information reduce local monopsony power and
compel traders to increase both the price and the quantity purchased. Moreover,
improvements in information are likely to increase the incentives of farmers to sell
soybean in the mandis as opposed to outside village merchants, leading to a higher
volume of soybean being transacted in government regulated markets.
21A similar pattern of result emerges with alternative measures of nearness such as within 10
kms, within 30kms, within 50kms, etc.
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3.6 Price Dispersion
In the theoretical model presented above, the pre-intervention price offered
by each trader depends on the Θi(i = 1, 2), the fraction of farmers who know
the price offered by trader i. With asymmetric Θ’s, there is price dispersion in
equilibrium. The penetration of kiosks over time increases information provision,
making Θi → 1. Therefore, we expect dispersion in the price of soybean to reduce
within the group of mandis that were “treated”. However, information provision
could increase dispersion between the treated and untreated mandis, since price
went up only in treated mandis but not in the untreated.
The magnitude of price dispersion faced by soybean farmers is substantial.
For instance, the tenth and ninetieth percentile of the mode price of soybean across
mandis in May 1998 is Rs.775/Qtl. and Rs.1002/Qtl. respectively. I examine the
amount of price dispersion by computing the standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation of mode price across mandis located in a district within a given month.
These two complementary measures are commonly used in the literature. The co-
efficient of variation, defined as (sd/mean), is a unit free measure of relative price
dispersion (Sorensen [2000], Baye and Morgan [2001], Bizan and Greenstein [2004]).
There are on average five mandis located in each district as shown in Map 3. My
sample is collapsed to observations at the district-month level. Table 13, shows that
the mean coefficient of variation of price across mandis declines on average after
internet kiosks are introduced. The coefficients in columns 1-2 are negative and sig-
nificant but very small. Similarly, the standard deviation in the price of soy across
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mandis is also decreasing post intervention, suggesting a reduction in spatial price
variability.
3.7 Output Response
If the average price of soybean in the mandis increased after the introduction of the
kiosks, it is important to examine the output response on the part of farmers. The
presence of kiosks and hubs may create entry and exit in response to an increase
in the price. To the extent that farmers have an incentive to expand area and pro-
duction of soy, we might expect a change in the mix of crops grown by farmers.
Moreover, the triple difference estimation relies on the assumption that the alter-
native crops (maize and groundnut) are not affected by the intervention. This can
be directly tested by using annual district level production data to estimate the
following equation:
yjt = β1 + β2Kjt + β3Hjt + δj + νt + tωj + εjt (3.4)
where yjt is the outcome of interest for district j in year t. δj’s are a full set
of district fixed effects that control for time invariant district characteristics. νt’s
represent a full set of year fixed effects controlling for climate shocks and other
secular changes in outcome variables that are common across all districts of the
state. District-specific linear time trends (tωj) controlling for the possibility of a
spurious correlation between the introduction of kiosks (and hubs) and outcomes
across districts are also included in the above specification. εjt is a district-year
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specific error term. Standard errors are adjusted for within-district correlation,
since the data consists of repeated observations over time for each district. Kjt and
Hjt are indicator variables denoting whether kiosks and hubs exist in district j in
year t.
Panel A in Table 14 presents the results from estimating equation (3.4) to
examine the effect of the intervention on net area cultivated.22 The total (net) area
cultivated under all crops grown in the same season as soy is not significantly affected
by the intervention.23 However, there appears to be a positive and significant impact
of the intervention on the area cultivated under soy (columns 2-3). The presence
of a kiosk in a district is associated with an increase in the fraction of area under
soy by 2.9 percentage points. Since the overall area cultivated is not affected by the
intervention, this suggests that farmers are substituting away from an alternative
crop and into soy. In columns 4-6, I find a negative association between the presence
of kiosks and the area cultivated under rice in a district. I do not find a significant
effect of the intervention on any of the other 16 crops grown in this season in
the state. Specifically, the fraction of area under maize and groundnut are not
significantly affected by the presence of kiosks and hubs as presented in columns
7-10. This result lends further support to our identification assumption in the triple
difference strategy. In panel B (columns 3-4), the intervention is associated with a
positive effect on the production of soy, and the coefficient is significant at the 10
22According to Duflo and Pande [2005], the net measure accounts for relevant area at a single
point in the year, while gross area accounts for each separate use of the same area during a year.
Soybean, maize and groundnut are cultivated only during the monsoon season, hence the relevant
measure in this analysis is net.
23Total (net) area cultivated includes area under all 18 crops (6 cereals, 5 pulses, 7 oilseeds)
grown during the kharif season of Madhya Pradesh.
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percent level.
This important effect on output strengthens the argument that improvements
in information are indeed translating into higher return for farmers; otherwise I
would not expect to find a change in their planting behavior.
3.8 Welfare Analysis
Figure 11 shows the basic analytics of the welfare change as a result of this
intervention. The pre-intervention monopsony equilibrium in the mandis is given
by (pm, qm).
24 After the intervention, there is, on average, a 2 percent increase in
the mandi price and a 19 percent increase in soy production as estimated above. Of
the 19 percent increase in total production, approximately 3 percent is bought by
ITC annually, which results in an increase of soy production by 15 percent being
transacted in the mandis. Hence, the post-intervention competitive equilibrium
in the mandis is characterized by (1.02pm, 1.15qm).
25 Under the assumption of a
linear supply curve, the pre-intervention profits of the farmers, given by D, can
be calculated to be 0.065pmqm. After the intervention, the profits of the farmers
are characterized by D+C+F.26 There is a 33 percent (C+F ) net gain in profits of
24Since the supply curve facing the monopsonist slopes upward, the marginal factor cost curve
lies above the supply curve. The traders purchase soybeans up to the quantity at which the
marginal factor cost is equal to the marginal revenue product, qm in Figure 11. Since the traders
want to pay the lowest price at which the farmers are willing to provide qm, the equilibrium price
is given by the height of the supply curve at this quantity pm.
25With a linear supply curve, P = a + bQ, b is calculated to be equal to 0.13pm/qm and
a = 0.87pm. The marginal factor cost (a + 2bQ) at qm is calculated to be equal to 1.13pm. For
the traders, the demand for soybeans is a derived demand determined by its marginal revenue
product. Under the assumption of linearity, P = r− sQ, s is calculated to be equal to 0.73pm/qm
and r = 1.86pm.
26This can be calculated to be equal to 0.0865pmqm, where C =0.02pmqm and F=0.0015pmqm
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the farmers of which 31 percent (C ) represents the redistribution of surplus away
from traders to farmers and an additional 2 percent (F ) is the the welfare gain of
deadweight loss under monopsony.
The profits of the traders before the intervention, given by A+B+C, can be
calculated to be equal to 0.5pmqm. The traders lose 4 percent of its profits (C ) to
the farmers and gain an additional 2 percent E after the competitive equilibrium,
resulting in a net loss of 2 percent in traders profits. Thus, here is an example of an
important innovation that results in a much larger net gain for the farmers but not
a huge net loss for the traders. A caveat is in order when interpreting these results
for soybeans since a general equilibrium approach of monopsony would require an
examination of its effects within the context of the entire market economy compris-
ing of all crops transacted in the mandis.
3.9 Alternative Explanations
Improvement in Quality
A legitimate concern is that the increase in price observed post intervention may
actually reflect an increase in the overall quality of soybean over time. As mentioned
earlier, there is an unobservable aspect to soybean quality that refers to the oil and
protein content of the seed, and there is an observable aspect of quality that refers to
the presence of moisture, dirt and damaged seeds in each lot of produce. An increase
in either one or both of these aspects of quality will tend to bias my results. Kiosks
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provide information on farming techniques, and this information could lead to an
improvement in unobservable aspects of quality. Unfortunately, I do not observe
quality contingent prices of crops. The M.P. Marketing Board does not publish
monthly prices with quality grading. Given this shortcoming, I provide two pieces
of suggestive evidence that an overall improvement in quality is not what is driving
my results.
Table 15 provides estimates of the effect of the intervention on the annual yield
of crops. While this is circumstantial evidence, it seems plausible that improvements
in technique that led to increased quality would also improve yield. I find no evidence
of a significant increase in annual district level yield of soy.
A related concern is that perhaps, farmers clean up their produce more after
the introduction of kiosks, which would increase the observable aspects of quality
leading to an increase in price. This is a valid concern, because daily buying of
soybean in local markets and hubs is based on observable features of quality. The
Government of India announces a minimum support price (MSP) of soybean for a
certain quality threshold each year. It is required by law that only soybean of quality
below the MSP quality be sold at a price below MSP. To examine the impact of the
intervention on observable quality, I restrict the sample to mandi-month cells where
the observed monthly mode price of soybean is below the MSP. This sub-sample
has 1101 observations. If improvement in observable aspects of quality creates an
increase in price that is spuriously attributed to the key explanatory variables, then
the impact of the intervention on the price of soybean in this sub-sample should
also be positive. The coefficients on Kjt and Hjt are negative, very small and not
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significantly different from zero.27 Moreover, any systematic improvement in quality
over time is likely to be captured by the time trends included in all the estimation
equations. The incentive of the farmers, post intervention, to clean up each lot
offered for sale is the same as before since the quality scale used by buyers operating
both inside and outside the mandis is the same pre and post intervention.
These pieces of empirical evidence lend support to the assertion that the in-
crease in price was due primarily to the increase in information to farmers and the
resulting increase in competitiveness of buyers in mandis. Anecdotally, farmers were
not aware of any new varieties of soy growing seed being introduced in this period
leading to a substantial improvement in overall quality. Although information on
improved farming techniques and weather forecasts are available through the kiosks,
considerable overall improvement in quality appears to be a longer term change.
3.10 Conclusion
The introduction of internet kiosks across districts of the state of Madhya
Pradesh is associated with a significant increase in the monthly price of soybean in
government regulated wholesale agricultural markets. On average, the mandi price
of soy increased by 1-5 percent after the introduction of kiosks, lending support to
the predictions of the theoretical model. While the presence of hubs appears to have
no significant effect on price, hubs are associated with a dramatic reduction in the
volume of sales in the mandis, as sales are diverted from the mandis to the hubs.
27The results are similar if the sample is restricted instead to those mandi -month cells where
the monthly minimum or maximum price is below the MSP. These sub-samples contain 3193 and
566 observations respectively.
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The dispersion in price across affected mandis in Madhya Pradesh also appears to
decrease post intervention. Moreover, there is a significant increase in the area under
soy cultivation due to the intervention.
I use inter-district variation in the timing and spatial heterogeneity in the
location of kiosks and warehouses to isolate the causal effect. My estimates are ro-
bust to disaggregated measures of treatment and comparisons with alternative crops
grown in the same season as soy. The findings show that information provision is
potentially crucial to increasing the efficiency of rural markets in central India. The
analysis also contributes to an understanding of the role of information technology
in enhancing rural development by removing information asymmetries and making
traders in local mandis more competitive.
The movement from monopsony to competitive equilibrium results in a signif-
icant redistribution of surplus away from the traders to the farmers. The efficiency
gain of the deadweight loss from monopsony is shared amongst farmers and traders.
This results overall, in a much larger net gain for the farmers but not a huge net
loss for the traders. It appears that the traders are losing some of their traditional
monopsony power and facing a shrinking market. The ITC initiative is part of an
overall institutional change in the marketing environment, although traders might
well be able to manoeuver themselves to a more advantageous position in rural
central India in the long run.
I conclude that a change in the procurement strategy of a private buyer of
soybean in Madhya Pradesh has had significant spillover effects on the movement
of prices across agricultural mandis in the state. The immediate benefit to ITC
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Limited of this intervention was the improvement in procurement efficiency of soy-
beans resulting from the creation of a direct marketing channel and a reduction in
its transaction costs. According to Kumar [2004], “ITC calculated that it saved Rs.
13.3 million in transaction costs or almost 2 percent of the total value of the produce
in the first season of procurement through this intervention.” This feature makes
the intervention self sustaining because it is profitable for the private company to
implement it. As pointed out by Jensen [2007], this is important because many
of the experiments undertaken by governments and NGOs to implement internet
based projects in developing countries have not met with the same success. With
subsequent expansion across nine states in India, this intervention has become the
single-largest information technology based intervention by a corporate entity in
rural India.
Although this study sheds light on the implications of this intervention for the
functioning of mandis, the impact on net income and welfare of the farmers is an
open question. If panel data were available measuring farmer characteristics such as
the number of acres owned, the types of crops grown and harvested, quantity and
quality of the crop sold, transportation costs incurred, number of traders and daily
prices, one could measure accurately the individual response to this intervention.
Future research could then determine the general equilibrium effects of improved
information on wages, poverty and investment incentives faced by farmers.
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Table 1: Total Number of Kiosks and Hubs Built Across 23 (out of 45) Districts of the State 
   
Districts # Kiosks # Hubs 
Betul 43 1 
Bhopal 62 2 
Chhindwara 31 1 
Damoh 16 1 
Dewas 127 1 
Dhar 46 1 
Guna 152 3 
Harda 68 3 
Hoshangabad 89 4 
Indore 105 3 
Khandwa 53 1 
Mandsaur 56 1 
Narsinghpur 32 1 
Neemuch 53 2 
Raisen 64 2 
Rajgarh 110 4 
Ratlam 91 2 
Sagar 58 2 
Sehore 110 3 
Shajapur 116 2 
Shivpuri 13 0 
Ujjain 133 3 
Vidisha 76 2 
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Table 2: Installation Date of the First Kiosk and First Hub Across Districts of Madhya Pradesh 
District Date of First Kiosk Date of First Hub 
Betul Mar-03 Apr-03 
Bhopal Nov-00 Oct-03 
Chhindwara Mar-03 Oct-03 
Damoh Apr-03 Nov-03 
Dewas Dec-00 Apr-03 
Dhar Jan-01 Oct-02 
Guna Mar-01 Nov-01 
Harda Oct-00 Oct-02 
Hoshangabad Nov-00 Oct-02 
Indore Dec-00 Sep-01 
Khandwa Sep-01 Oct-01 
Mandsaur Mar-02 Nov-03 
Narsinghpur Apr-03 Nov-03 
Neemuch Jun-02 Oct-02 
Raisen Oct-00 Oct-00 
Rajgarh May-01 Nov-03 
Ratlam Dec-00 Oct-03 
Sagar Apr-03 Nov-03 
Sehore Oct-00 Apr-02 
Shajapur Dec-00 May-02 
Shivpuri Nov-01 None 
Ujjain Oct-00 Oct-03 
Vidisha Apr-01 Apr-02 
Notes: The installation date of an internet kiosk is defined as the day the computer equipment was 
installed in the village by ITC. The hub installation date is defined as the day the first direct sale 





Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 N   Mean   Std. Dev. 
A. Kiosks and Hubs      
Any Kiosk in a District 15378  0.47  0.50 
Number of Kiosks in a District 15378  26.13  39.59 
Any Hub in a district 15378  0.30  0.46 
Number of Hubs in a District 15378  0.52  0.95 
Kiosk within 40 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.37  0.48 
Kiosk within 60 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.48  0.50 
Kiosk within 80 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.55  0.50 
Hub within 40 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.23  0.42 
Hub within 60 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.32  0.47 
Hub within 80 Kms of a mandi 15378  0.41  0.49 
      
B. Mandi Level Price and Sales      
Mode Price of Soy 10915  1163.02  235.70 
Maximum Price of Soy 10921  1230.28  256.05 
Minimum Price of Soy 10921  1046.04  230.79 
Mode Price of Soy below Minimum Support Price 1101  836.35  63.79 
Mode Price of Soy in the Fourth Quarter 2672  1102.66  187.06 
Coefficient of Variation in Price of Soy across mandis 15378  0.08  0.02 
Mode Price of Maize 6463  473.36  80.35 
Mode Price of Groundnut 2914  1357.21  283.74 
Sales Volume of Soy 11435  1359.34  3245.49 
      
C. District Level Output      
Total Area Cultivated 315  223.63  116.47 
Fraction of Area under Soybean 315  0.39  0.34 
Fraction of Area under Maize 309  0.06  0.07 
Fraction of Area under Groundnut 312  0.02  0.06 
Fraction of Area under Rice 315  0.20  0.26 
Total Production 315  186.22  118.17 
Soy Production 315  97.39  101.47 
Maize Production 309  30.72  44.13 
Groundnut Production 312  4.92  12.40 





Table 4: Share (%)  in Total Volume of Production of Crops Grown during the Monsoon Season  in the State 
        
State  Western Region  Eastern Region 
Crops Share (%)  Crops Share (%)  Crops Share (%) 
Soybean 49.44  Soybean 68.57  Rice 39.61 
Rice 14.82  Maize 11.36  Maize 12.40 
Maize 11.71  Sorghum 6.61  Soybean 10.94 
Sorghum 7.62  Cottonseed 3.78  Sorghum 9.66 
Cottonseed 4.59  Red Gram 2.83  Cottonseed 6.21 
Red Gram 3.13  Rice 2.51  Millet 5.29 
Groundnut 2.51  Groundnut 2.30  Red Gram 3.74 
Notes: Sample includes district level production in the year 1998/99 obtained from the Commissioner of Land 
Records, Government of Madhya Pradesh. Total production includes production of all 18 crops (6 cereals, 5 pulses, 
7 oilseeds) grown during the monsoon (kharif) season of Madhya Pradesh. 
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Table 5: Initial Levels of Soybean Price and Timing of Kiosk Introduction 
          
Panel A: Dependent Variable: District Ever Received Kiosks  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Soy Price in 1998 0.006  0.004  
 [0.006]  [0.007]  
Soy Price in 1999  0.010 0.006  
  [0.010] [0.011]  
Change in Soy Price 1998-1999    -0.004 
    [0.006] 
Constant -4.985 -7.584 -8.323 0.373 
 [5.256] [7.910] [8.080] [0.681] 
         
Observations 22 22 22 22 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.02 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: District Received Kiosks in 2000  Rather than 2001/2002 
          
Soy Price in 1998 0.020  0.024  
 [0.012]  [0.013]  
Soy Price in 1999  -0.002 -0.009  
  [0.009] [0.012]  
Change in Soy Price 1998-1999    -0.015 
    [0.011] 
Constant -17.501 1.67 -13.568 -1.017 
 [11.081] [7.659] [11.921] [1.067] 
         
Observations 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.14 0.02 0.18 0.19 
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Table 6: Basic Result - Effect of the Intervention on Monthly Price of Soybean in Wholesale Markets of Madhya Pradesh 
Dependent Variable Log(Mode Soybean Price) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Kiosk 0.012  0.012    
 [0.006]*  [0.006]*    
Hub  0.005 0.004    
  [0.007] [0.007]    
Kiosk Pre 1-6 Months     0.004  
     [0.006]  
Kiosk Post 0-5 Months    0.013 0.016  
    [0.005]* [0.008]*  
Kiosk Post 6+ Months    0.011 0.015  
    [0.008] [0.011]  
Hub Pre 1-6 Months      -0.001 
      [0.006] 
Hub Post 0-5 Months      0.011 
      [0.008] 
Hub Post 6+ Months      -0.004 
       [0.011] 
Observations 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the log monthly mode price of soybean in mandis located in districts. 
Sample includes the price of soybean recorded in 233 main mandis in 45 districts of the state of Madhya 
Pradesh over a period of 66 months (from April 2000 to September 2005). The unit of observation is a 
mandi-district-month. Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk in a district. Similarly, Hub 
is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub in a district. Kiosk Pre1-6 Months is an indicator variable 
for six months leading up to kiosk introduction in a district. Kiosk 0-5 months is an indicator variable for 
the month the kiosk is introduced and the first five months thereafter. Kiosk 6+ is an indicator variable for 
the sixth month and beyond kiosk introduction in a district. All regressions include mandi and month fixed 
effects as well as district time trends.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered by district to account for the 
fact that the intervention varies only by district-month, and correct for serial correlation in the error term. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  65




Panel A: Full Sample (45 Districts) 
 All Quarters Fourth Quarter 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Kiosk 0.012  0.013 0.017  0.016 0.018  0.016 0.023  0.019 
 [0.005]*  [0.006]* [0.007]*  [0.007]* [0.007]*  [0.007]* [0.010]*  [0.012] 
Hub  0.002 0.002  0.011 0.009  0.011 0.009  0.024 0.02 
  [0.005] [0.006]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.014] [0.015] 
Mandi FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mandi Linear Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
District Linear Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                          
Observations 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 2672 2672 2672 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
             
Panel B: 23 "Treated" Districts            
  All Quarters Fourth Quarter 
Kiosk 0.009  0.009 0.009  0.008 0.009  0.008 0.024  0.021 
 [0.005]+  [0.005]+ [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.013]+  [0.013] 
Hub  0.003 0.002  0.010 0.009  0.010 0.009  0.019 0.015 
  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.014] [0.014] 
Mandi FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mandi Linear Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
District Linear Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                          
Observations 8259 8259 8259 8259 8259 8259 8259 8259 8259 1965 1965 1965 




Table 8: Effect on Monthly Minimum and Maximum Price of Soybean in Wholesale Markets of Madhya Pradesh 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Soybean Price 
          
 Minimum Price  Maximum Price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Kiosk 0.017  0.016   0.006  0.006  
 [0.007]*  [0.008]*   [0.005]  [0.005]  
Hub  0.008 0.005    0.005 0.004  
  [0.011] [0.011]    [0.007] [0.006]  
Kiosk Pre 1-6 Months    0.017     0.0006 
    [0.010]     [0.007] 
Kiosk Post 0-5 Months    0.030     0.006 
    [0.009]**     [0.007] 
Kiosk Post 6+ Months    0.028     0.007 
        [0.012]*         [0.010] 
Observations 10921 10921 10921 10921  10921 10921 10921 10921 
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74   0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log monthly minimum or maximum price of soybean in mandis located in districts. Sample 
includes the price of soybean recorded in 233 main mandis in 45 districts of the state of Madhya Pradesh over a period of 66 months 
(from April 2000 to September 2005). The unit of observation is a mandi-district-month. There are 38 instances where the price is 
recorded as zero and 4419 missing observations. Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk in a district. Similarly, Hub is 
an indicator variable for whether there is a hub in a district. Kiosk Pre1-6 Months is an indicator variable for six months leading up to 
kiosk introduction in a district. Kiosk 0-5 months is an indicator variable for the month of kiosk introduction and five subsequent 
months in a district. Kiosk 6+ is an indicator variable for the sixth month and beyond kiosk introduction in a district. All regressions 
include mandi and month fixed effects as well as district time trends.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered by district to account for 
the fact that the intervention varies only by district-month, and correct for serial correlation in the error term. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Effect on Monthly Price of Soybean Relative to Alternative Crops 
        
Dependent Variable: Log Price of Crops 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Soybean to Maize   
Soy*Kiosk 0.047  0.053 
 [0.021]*  [0.021]* 
Soy*Hub  0.019 -0.011 
  [0.018] [0.014] 
Observations 11588 11588 11588 
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Panel B: Soybean to Groundnut 
Soy*Kiosk 0.018  0.017 
 [0.031]  [0.035] 
Soy*Hub  0.013 0.002 
  [0.029] [0.033] 
Observations 5166 5166 5166 
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Panel C: Maize to Groundnut   
Maize*Kiosk -0.002  -0.018 
 [0.034]  [0.045] 
Maize*Hub  0.017 0.028 
  [0.037] [0.048] 
Observations 3582 3582 3582 









Table 10: Effect on Monthly Price of Soybean in Wholesale Markets Located Near a Hub and Kiosk 
 
Notes: The depen  variab he l hly m rice of ean i ndis. S e in  th f s n rec ed in
main mandis in the state of Madhya Pradesh over a period of 66 months (from April 2000 to September 2005). The unit of observation is a 
mandi-month. There are 35 instances where the price is recorded as zero and 4428 missing observations. In columns 1-3, Hub is an indicator 
variable for whether there is a hub within 40 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub that 
is within 40 kms of a mandi. In columns 4-6, Hub is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub within 60 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an 
indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub that is within 60 kms of a mandi; similarly in columns 7-9. All regressions 
include mandi and month fixed effects as well as mandi linear trends.  Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by mandi. * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dent le is t og mont ode p  soyb n ma ampl cludes e price o oybea ord  233 
                          
Dependent Variable: Log of monthly mode price of soy      
     
 within 40 kms of a mandi within 60 kms of a mandi within 80 kms of a mandi within 100 kms of a mandi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Kiosk 0.016  0.016 0.013  0.014 0.006  0.005 0.0005  -0.003 
 [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.005]  [0.006] [0.006]  [0.007] 
Hub  0.003 0.002  0.002 0.003  0.004 0.003  0.008 0.008 
  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.005] [0.005] 
                          
Observations 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 






Table 11: Impact of the Intervention on Monthly Mode Price of Soybean in Wholesale Markets (Robustness Checks) 
 
                    
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Mode Price of Soy  
Panel A: Within 40 kms of a mandi         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Kiosk 0.009  0.011 0.022  0.021 0.014  0.014 
 [0.006]  [0.006] [0.007]**  [0.007]** [0.007]  [0.007]* 
Hub  -0.001 -0.005  0.008 0.007  0.004 0.001 
  [0.005] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.007]  [0.006] [0.007] 
Mandi FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mandi Linear Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
District Linear Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
          
Panel B: Within 60 kms of a mandi         
Kiosk 0.011  0.013 0.019  0.019 0.015  0.015 
 [0.005]  [0.005]** [0.006]**  [0.006]** [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Hub  -0.001 -0.005  0.002 0.002  0.001 0.001 
  [0.005] [0.004]  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.005] [0.004] 
Mandi FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mandi Linear Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
District Linear 
Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 10915 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log monthly mode price of soybean in mandis. Sample includes the price of soybean recorded in 233 main 
mandis in the state of Madhya Pradesh over a period of 66 months (from April 2000 to September 2005). The unit of observation is a mandi-month. 
There are 35 instances where the price is recorded as zero and 4428 number of missing observations. In columns 1-3, Hub is an indicator variable 
for whether there is a hub within 40 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub that is within 40 
kms of a mandi. In columns 4-6, Hub is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub within 60 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an indicator variable 
for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub that is within 60 kms of a mandi.  All regressions include mandi and month fixed effects as well as 
mandi linear trends.  Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by mandi. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 12: Effect on Monthly Sales Volume of Soybean in Wholesale Markets Located Near a Hub and Kiosk 
            
Dependent Variable: Log Volume of Soybean Sales 
            
 District Level Effect  Within 40 kms of a mandi  Within 60 kms of a mandi 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
            
Kiosk 0.190  0.190  0.260  0.265  0.416  0.419 
 [0.157]  [0.164]  [0.091]**  [0.090]**  [0.095]**  [0.098]** 
Hub  0.026 0.002   -0.200 -0.205   -0.029 -0.019 
  [0.107] [0.110]   [0.068]** [0.067]**   [0.066] [0.068] 
            
Observations 11435 11435 11435   11435 11435 11435   11435 11435 11435 
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75   0.76 0.76 0.76   0.77 0.76 0.77 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the log monthly sales volume of soybean in mandis. Sample includes the quantity of soybean 
sold in 233 main mandis in the state of Madhya Pradesh over a period of 66 months (from April 2000 to September 2005). There 
are 843 instances where the price is recorded as zero and 3100 missing observations. In columns 1-3, Kiosk is an indicator 
variable for whether there is a kiosk in a district. Similarly, Hub is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub in a district. In 
columns 4-6, Hub is an indicator variable for whether there is a hub within 40 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an indicator variable 
for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub that is within 40 kms of a mandi. In columns 7-9, Hub is an indicator variable for 
whether there is a hub within 60 kms of a mandi and Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk linked to a hub 
that is within 60 kms of a mandi. The regressions in columns 1-3 include mandi and month fixed effects and district time trends. 
The standard errors are clustered at the district level. In columns 4-9, all regressions include mandi and month fixed effects as 





Table 13: Effect on Price Dispersion 
            
Dependent Variable      
 Coefficient of Variation  Standard Deviation 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
      
Kiosk -0.009 -0.008  -10.004 -8.663 
 [0.004]* [0.004]*  [4.500]* [4.105]* 
Hub  -0.006   -7.304 
  [0.004]   [5.351] 
            
Observations 2188 2188  2188 2188 
R-squared 0.27 0.27   0.34 0.34 
Notes: The dependent variable is the coefficient of variation, or the standard 
deviation in the monthly mode price of soybean across mandis located in a district 
within a given month.  The unit of observation is a district-month. There are 782 
number of missing observations. All regressions include district and month fixed 
effects as well as district linear trends.  Robust standard errors in brackets are 











Table 14: Effect on Area and Production of Crops 
 
PANEL A : Area 
                                                                                          Dependent Variables       
 
Log (Total Area 
Cultivated)  
Fraction of Area 
under Soybean  
Fraction of Area 
under Rice  
Fraction of Area 
under Maize  
Fraction of Area 
under Groundnut 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Kiosk 0.0003 0.001  0.029 0.029  -0.012 -0.013  
-
0.0001 -0.0001  0.001 0.001 
 [0.025] [0.025]  [0.009]** [0.009]**  [0.005]* [0.005]*  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.001] [0.001] 
Hub  -0.005       -0.002   0.009   -0.002   0.001 
  [0.031]   [0.013]   [0.009]   [0.003]   [0.002] 
               
Observations 315 315  315 315  315 315  306 306  311 311 
               
PANEL B:  Production                                                                                         Dependent 










 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Kiosk 0.052 0.042  0.192 0.192  -0.002 -0.025  0.043 0.042  -0.092 -0.103 
 [0.094] [0.097]  [0.114]+ [0.117]  [0.101] [0.102]  [0.093] [0.094]  [0.092] [0.101] 
Hub  0.090   0.002   0.201   0.006   0.093 
  [0.119]   [0.134]   [0.156]   [0.141]   [0.179] 
               







Table 15: Effect of the Intervention on Yield of Crops 
 
                        
  Dependent Variable:       
 Soy Yield  Rice Yield  Maize Yield  Groundnut Yield 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Kiosk 0.066 0.038  -0.025 -0.040  0.016 0.011  0.068 0.059 
 [0.137] [0.126]  [0.123] [0.132]  [0.084] [0.086]  [0.125] [0.127] 
Hub  0.245   0.128   0.052   0.075 
  [0.167]   [0.141]   [0.100]   [0.094] 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
District Linear Trend Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                        
Observations 315 315   315 315   308 308   311 311 
R-squared 0.72 0.73   0.78 0.78   0.75 0.75   0.58 0.58 
Notes: All dependent variables are in Logs. The unit of observation is a district-year. Missing district*year observations account 
for actual sample size. Kiosk is an indicator variable for whether there is a kiosk in a district. Similarly, Hub is an indicator 
variable for whether there is a hub in a district.  All regressions include district and year fixed effects as well as district linear 



















































































Figure 2: Major Soybean Producing Districts of Madhya Pradesh 
















Figure 3: Distribution of Mandis and Hubs in the State 





























































































Figure 6:  Network of Roads in the State  



























































































Figure 9: Percentage of Districts with Any Kiosk and Any Hub in the State 
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